Analityczne wykorzystywanie plików cookies
CVE-2021-46935: linux kernel vulnerability
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space") fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch, sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size. Unfortunately, on the "free" side, the accounting of async_free_space did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or less. These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue has gone undetected for several years. The fix is to use "buffer_size" (the allocated buffer size) instead of "size" (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space during the free operation. These are the same except for this corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads < 8 bytes.
- CVSS
- 5.5 MEDIUM
- EPSS
- 13.67%
- Aktywnie wykorzystywana
- brak w KEV
- Produkt
- linux kernel
Co wiadomo
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix async_free_space accounting for empty parcels In 4.13, commit 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space") fixed a kernel structure visibility issue. As part of that patch, sizeof(void *) was used as the buffer size for 0-length data payloads so the driver could detect abusive clients sending 0-length asynchronous transactions to a server by enforcing limits on async_free_size. Unfortunately, on the "free" side, the accounting of async_free_space did not add the sizeof(void *) back. The result was that up to 8-bytes of async_free_space were leaked on every async transaction of 8-bytes or less. These small transactions are uncommon, so this accounting issue has gone undetected for several years. The fix is to use "buffer_size" (the allocated buffer size) instead of "size" (the logical buffer size) when updating the async_free_space during the free operation. These are the same except for this corner case of asynchronous transactions with payloads < 8 bytes.